Week 14: Capabilities, Systems, and Participation
A couple of essays published this week on domestic violence and voting systems, and approaching the grand spectacle of India's democracy
A few years ago I spent six months in Iceland. Iceland is famously known as “the best place to be a woman”, given that it has topped the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index for 14 years straight. But speaking to women in Iceland this was considered something of a joke. Iceland may be very strong in women’s education and political participation, as well as have excellent health outcomes and more equitable pay, but it still has high rates of violence against women, including sexual violence, and a justice system that is deeply suspicious of women.
The Gender Gap Index doesn’t measure safety or justice. It seems absurd that these criteria wouldn’t be considered when assessing the status of women in each country. Making the index itself indicative of a problem that we collectively don’t want to confront.
So while in Iceland I got thinking about why a country that is advanced with some aspects of women’s equality would also remain hostile to women in other areas? The first clue is what is known as the Nordic Paradox – that countries with higher rates of gender equality also maintain high rates of violence against women. The theory is that women’s advancement inflames men’s resentment.
But justice systems should be more in control of their own emotions. So why would Iceland’s justice system be so suspicious of women who are victims of violence (or seek to protect their children from violence)?
Iceland is a distinct country in that it is very small (less than 400,000 people) and has some difficult conditions for essential things like agriculture. As a result, Iceland needs every pair of productive hands it can get. This has meant that confining women to the role of “homemaker” was never going to be an option. But this also means that there is a necessity to not take men’s violence seriously. To do so risks taking a great number of productive male hands out of the society, something instinctively deemed unaffordable.
But in thinking about this over the past few years I’ve come to realise that this is a calculation all states have made, regardless of their size and access to productive hands. This week I put together some thoughts and published an essay looking a domestic violence and social contract theory – Domestic Violence: A Hobbesian Dilemma.
In the piece I pose the question – what if the state saw its own capabilities through the capabilities of women? We’re currently in a transition period, where women’s educational attainment is outpacing men’s, their economic worth is rising, and women are deemed more trustworthy as political leaders in many states. But the state – as a capabilities maximising entity – hasn’t yet come to value this in terms of expecting greater security for women.
The UK’s Voting Preference
In my early-20s I spent a couple of years living in London. Given my difficult relationship with Australia, London felt like home. I loved it. There’s no place I’ve ever felt more comfortable. However, due to being effectively skill-less at the time, after 2 years I ran out visa options and had to leave. I cried on the plane all the way back to Melbourne, and, internally, I’ve never really stopped crying.
As a result, I still invest a lot of time in British politics. And this inevitably means listening to The Rest Is Politics podcast. I suspect most people are aware of the podcast, but for those who aren’t it is hosted by Alastair Campbell, the former communications director for Tony Blair, and Rory Stewart, a former Tory cabinet minister. It’s widely mocked by cynics, but remains essential listening for people who wish to have a more genuine and good-faith approach to politics.
Barely a week goes without both Campbell and Stewart arguing that the UK needs to change its voting system. This is, of course, absolutely true. First-past-the-post is a terrible system and all countries that use it should be deeply ashamed of themselves. However, both men have become convinced that Proportional Representation is the system the country should use.
I think this is a bad idea. So this week I published an essay – The Rest Are Preferences – outlining why I think Preferential Voting (or Ranked Choice Voting) as used by Australia is a better system. Especially for Westminster parliamentary systems.
Australia frustrates me in many ways, but in terms of its electoral structures the country is excellent – independent electoral commissions are great, compulsory voting is great, and preferential voting is great. We should be a beacon to the world with these things.
Explaining Indian Democracy
Speaking of electoral politics, in this year of democracy, the biggest election is the forthcoming Indian one (although the U.S presidential election is probably the most consequential). I’ve been drawn away from India in recent years, but it is a country that I love and continue to following closely – although maybe a little less than previously, given that it’s now been quite a few years since I’ve made a visit there (hopefully I’ll be back there one day soon).
India elections are incredibly complex and utterly fascinating. So I am very pleased that the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) is broadcasting a weekly series of programmes leading up to India’s election. The first of which aired this weekend.
The first episode lays out the mechanics of the system, and major players in the election. It’s a good briefing, and more in depth than you usually see on Australian television. The considerable increase in the Indian diaspora in Australia recently – and the efforts the Australian government is making to court India – has clearly led to the ABC dedicating more resources to issues concerning India. Which is a very good thing.
One criticism of this program though is that one of the election analysts interviewed uses OBCs, SCs and STs when discussing blocs of voters, but the report doesn’t explain these acronyms. For someone unfamiliar with India this would leave them very confused about his comments and what they meant.
Scheduled Castes (SCs) are generally the Dalits (although there is contest over whether this term is broader than SC). Scheduled Tribes (STs) are the indigenous people of India who preceded Indo-Aryan and Dravidian peoples (noting that there’s some anthropological contestation here). “Schedule” in the context of the Indian Constitution means table – sections of the constitution where various aspects are listed, such as states and territories, notable groups, and the languages the state will recognise. Other Backwards Class is a catch-all grouping for around half the population of India, who aren’t SCs or STs, but still have traditionally been disadvantaged.
Of course, one could be an OBC, SC or ST and still be successful. The enormous opportunities that have materialised in India over the past few decades has enabled a great many people to transcend their historical disadvantage. However, one seem to carry their designation regardless of their success. And many many political parties –particularly across northern India – organise themselves by these groups. Making them critical components of any election.
This Week’s Reading:
Brian Garsten – Journal of Democracy
“In times of liberal dominance—in the glow of 1989—such critics could be welcomed as gadflies to startle us, to interrupt our sometimes dangerously complacent satisfaction with the fruits of success. Today, however, we run the risk of overcorrecting. Coasting with momentum produced by generations of liberal politics, we imagine we no longer need its help. We suppose that the problems liberals responded to should no longer trouble us or, at least, that they no longer require liberal remedies. Frustrated by the injustices that seem to flourish in some of the spaces liberal pluralism protects, we are tempted to step back from pluralism. Indignant that the leaders we favor do not have more power to defeat our opponents, we become skeptical about constitutional checks on their authority. Liberal institutions and norms come to feel like constraints on our ability to pursue the good rather than safeguards against the bad. In this context, many of us have lost track of the motivating spirit of liberal societies and, perhaps even more significantly, we have almost forgotten what can be admirable and adventurous in them.
The crucial starting point for liberals is a set of fundamental, recurring problems that often arise in political life. Human beings living together tend to fall into relatively closed tribal groups and to enforce their norms in quiet but unforgiving ways. We are mostly docile but we can be brought, occasionally, to erupt into furious, fanatical violence against anyone who strays from our conventions. We are usually brought to that boiling point by the incitement of some politician, preacher, or military man as a part of the more or less constant jousting that takes place among the most ambitious individuals, those whom Machiavelli would have called "princes" or aspiring princes. The rest of us tend to be at their mercy. Liberals at their best focus on trying to reduce our vulnerability to these political entrepreneurs. The liberal values of individual choice and consent, mobility, and the possibility of exit—the values that support institutional pluralism and commercial society—are meant to respond to and mitigate this vulnerability.”
How To Fight Misinformation Without Censorship
Jacob Mchangama – Persuasion
“Even though more people will cast a ballot in 2024 than any previous year, the prevailing mood seems more fearful than celebratory. In the words of Darrell M. West, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, the combination of online influence campaigns and artificial intelligence has created a “perfect storm of disinformation” that threatens free and fair elections. This type of pessimism has led several open societies—including those of the European Union—to adopt illiberal measures such as banning foreign media outlets and cracking down on social media platforms. The rise of generative artificial intelligence has only heightened the sense of emergency.
Yet little attention has been paid to the fact that Team Democracy triumphed in one of 2024’s most decisive battles by staying true to its liberal values.
Taiwan is an instructive example of a young and vibrant democracy that views freedom of expression as a competitive advantage against authoritarian censorship and propaganda. In large part, Taiwan’s response to China’s aggressive disinformation campaigns has relied on a model where organic and civil society-led initiatives serve as first responders and heavy-handed government intervention is treated with great skepticism. Taiwan’s success provides a proof of concept that should prompt a change of course in European democracies, which increasingly believe that preserving their open societies requires sacrificing free expression.”
China Is Gaslighting the Developing World
Robert Manning – Foreign Policy
“Moreover, China is beginning to rival the United States in hypocrisy. This is evident in the gap between its professed principles, posturing, and actual behavior—from gaming the World Trade Organization system to economic coercion and protectionism to its military assertiveness from the Himalayas to the East and South China Seas based on dubious and discredited sovereignty claims.
When it comes to building a new order, China doesn’t have the sort of soft power or attractiveness of culture, openness, and opportunity that helped power U.S. dominance since World War II. Despite tensions, some 300,000 Chinese students flock to the United States every year—while just 350 U.S. students are left in China. Unlike other Asian states, there is not yet a Chinese equivalent to Bollywood, K-pop, Korean movies, or Japanese pop culture from Pokémon to Marie Kondo. A culture of growing censorship means there may well never be.
China appears, at best, an immature great power, its aspirations far exceeding its grasp and appeal. Beijing’s wannabe post-U.S. order faces a legitimacy deficit.”
A Hindu Nationalist Foreign Policy
Rohan Mukherjee – Foreign Affairs
“Most modern societies, of course, are nationalistic to some degree. But when foreign policy itself becomes nationalist, it gives rise to self-defeating risks. Today, India is embroiled in controversies over extraterritorial assassinations. Tomorrow, its government could find itself embroiled in controversies over the external interrogation of India’s democratic credentials, the treatment of Indians abroad, or China’s growing closeness to India’s smaller neighbors. It might, for example, interfere in the domestic politics of other countries to undermine foreign critics. It could economically bully smaller countries that do not fall in line. Great powers—including the United States—routinely resort to such tactics. But they are also well positioned to manage the consequences. As a rising power, India is still far from that level of global heft and influence.
A nationalist diplomacy backed by an increasingly confident and assertive public will also make such issues difficult to resolve by limiting the scope for compromise. Voters, for example, may turn against a government that—having set high expectations—falters in protecting expansive versions of the country’s interests and honour. National pride may know no bounds, but foreign policy must operate in a highly constrained environment. India’s political leadership will therefore have to work carefully to ensure that its nationalist diplomacy does not undermine national objectives. At the same time, India’s friends and partners will have to adjust to its assertive demeanour—in part, by making room for the country as it ascends in the international order.”
The Trouble With “The Global South”
Comfort Ero – Foreign Affairs
“A policy that focuses too heavily on a narrow cadre of non-Western states is insufficient. It can obscure the tensions among developing countries and the unique pressures—such as debt, climate change, demographic forces, and internal violence—that are shaping politics in many of them. In doing so, such a policy may also veil opportunities for building better ties with small and middle-sized states by addressing their individual interests. The term “global South” may offer a compelling but misleading simplicity (as can its counterpart, “the West”). Treating countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a geopolitical bloc, however, will not help solve the problems they face, nor will it bring the United States and its partners the influence they seek.
The terminology problem remains. Although many Western policymakers think they know better than to treat the non-Western world as an unvariegated whole, they should use the phrase “global South” with particular care. Specific dynamics within and among the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will shape their political futures more than their identity as a group. The West must see these states as they are, not fall for the fallacy that they operate geopolitically as a single entity.”
The Rise Of Middle-Finger Politics (podcast)
The Ezra Klein Show – New York Times
“Donald Trump can seem like a political anomaly. You sometimes hear people describe his connection with his base in quasi-mystical terms. But really, Trump is an example of an archetype — the right-wing populist showman — that recurs across time and place. There’s Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Boris Johnson in Britain, Javier Milei in Argentina. And there’s a long lineage of this type in the United States too.
So why is there this consistent demand for this kind of political figure? And why does this set of qualities — ethnonationalist politics and an entertaining style — repeatedly appear at all?
John Ganz is the writer of the newsletter Unpopular Front and the author of the forthcoming book “When the Clock Broke: Con Men, Conspiracists, and How America Cracked Up in the Early 1990s.” In this conversation, we discuss how figures like David Duke and Pat Buchanan were able to galvanize the fringes of the Republican Party; Trump’s specific brand of TV-ready charisma; and what liberals tend to overlook about the appeal of this populist political aesthetic.”
Revenge Will Be The Fuel Of A Second Trump Administration
Ivan Krastev – Financial Times
“Trump 2.0 will not be about respect or recognition, but about revenge. And the desire for payback is not simply a personal characteristic of the leader — it is the name of the game. By reinventing the Republican party around the myth of a stolen election, Trump doesn’t simply seek revenge, he expects to receive a mandate for it.
European experts trying to divine the priorities of a second Trump administration often make a costly mistake. They assume, correctly, that he has an instinctive revulsion of alliances and, in the words of his former national security adviser John Bolton, that for him “international problems are nails crying out for his tariff hammer”. And that this is enough to know what he will do. But they remain blind to the basic fact that populists don’t return to power with a list of policy priorities. They come back brandishing a list of enemies and regretting their previous naivete. Policy choices, such as they are, will be defined by the logic of revenge.”
Growing up the 1980s were maligned as a bit of a cultural joke. New decades obviously like to make fun of preceding ones – a way of demonstrating they are striding boldly into the future. But it is pretty clear now that the 80s were music’s best decade (and the 90s were generally dire).
The 80s is where I spent most of my time now, and as a result this classic Simple Minds song found its way into my ears this week. Having been unconsciously aware of the song I’ve spent most of my life thinking it was call “A Promise To America”